Bacon's Rebellion in Indian Country

James D. Rice

Bacon's Rebellion, a bitter civil war that convulsed the key English colony of Virginia in 1676, has long been considered one of the most significant events in American history. It is a fixture of high school and university courses, textbooks, and scholarly writing. Although the rebellion was condemned as treason by colonial-era writers, after the American Revolution it came to be regarded as an important step in the rise of freedom and democracy and thus as an integral part of the nation's creation story. This line of interpretation drew a stark contrast between the reactionary forces led by Virginia's royal governor Sir William Berkeley, the "archenemy of colonial democracy," and the frontier planters led by Nathaniel Bacon, the "patriot, who gave his life in the cause of American liberty" in a valiant attempt to get out from "under the heel of the mother country." This portrait of Bacon as a freedom-loving protorevolutionary came under heavy fire after World War II, however, when Wesley Frank Craven and Wilcomb Washburn demonstrated that it was incompatible with the evidence and with any reasonable definition of democracy. Bacon explicitly denied having any democratic ("leveling") tendencies; besides, the Baconites' main grievance was that Governor Berkeley "refused to authorize the slaughter and dispossession" of Virginia's Indian neighbors. Would a truly "democratic champion of the oppressed," Washburn asked, "limit his benevolence to whites only?"[1]

Craven's and Washburn's interventions forced a major reconsideration of Bacon's Rebellion beginning in the 1950s. Since then, two lines of investigation have predominated. One approach has been to identify the major fault lines within Virginia society prior to and during the rebellion. Did they lie between different kinds of elite tobacco planters,

James D. Rice is a professor of history at the State University of New York at Plattsburgh. He wishes to thank Michael Oberg, Alden T. Vaughn, and two other *JAH* reviewers for their valuable comments on earlier drafts of this article, as well as John Coombs, Brett Rushforth, David Silverman, Lorena Walsh, Anya Zilberstein, and the participants in seminars at the University of Utah, the University of Maryland, and Binghamton University. Funding for the research and writing of this article was provided by the John D. Rockefeller Jr. Library of Colonial Williamsburg, the Virginia Foundation for the Humanities, the Virginia Historical Society, and the Office of the Dean of Arts and Sciences at the State University of New York at Plattsburgh.

Readers may contact Rice at ricejd@plattsburgh.edu.

[1] For the culmination of the protorevolutionary interpretive tradition, see Thomas Jefferson Wertenbaker, *Torchbearer of the Revolution: The Story of Bacon's Rebellion and Its Leader* (Princeton, 1940), esp. 14, 34, 211. Wesley Frank Craven, *The Southern Colonies in the Seventeenth Century, 1607–1689* (Baton Rouge, 1949), 360–93. On the historiography of Bacon's Rebellion before the 1950s, see Wilcomb E. Washburn, *The Governor and the Rebel: A History of Bacon's Rebellion in Virginia* (Chapel Hill, 1957), 1–16; and John B. Frantz, ed., *Bacon's Rebellion: Prologue to the Revolution?* (Lexington, Mass., 1969). Washburn, *Governor and the Rebel,* viii, 163.

doi: 10.1093/jahist/jau651
© The Author 2014. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Organization of American Historians.
All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com.

as Bernard Bailyn argued? Or did strong county governments create a class of local elites whose independent power made it possible to defy the governor, as Warren Billings suggested? A second approach has been to work toward more sweeping statements about the rebellion's place in American history. Such writings have gravitated toward analyses of race, slavery, and the conquest of Native America. Michael Oberg, for instance, treats the rebellion as part of a long-running conflict between "frontiersmen" seeking the eradication of Indians and "metropolitans" favoring a more nuanced approach.[2]

The most influential interpretation of Bacon's Rebellion today, Edmund S. Morgan's *American Slavery, American Freedom* (1975), combines those two approaches. Morgan argues that the conflict brought out "the grievances of Virginia's impoverished freemen" and forced Virginians to find a way to resolve their deep-seated differences without another destructive civil war. The rebellion, an "instinctive attempt to subdue class conflict by racism," pointed the way toward a new settlement where white Virginians enjoyed greater liberty precisely because African Americans enjoyed less of it. In the wake of the rebellion "Virginia's ruling class" replaced most white indentured servants with slaves, "proclaimed that all white men were superior to black," and offered their "social (but white) inferiors" better economic opportunities and more political power. Whiteness also conferred numerous legal and social advantages, binding whites together in their shared liberties. For Morgan, then, 1676 was the pivotal moment in a long process during which "slavery and freedom made their way to England's first American colony and grew there together, the one supporting the other" through a combination of systemic oppression and white populism.[3]

Yet for all the attention that Bacon's Rebellion has garnered over the past two generations, the modern debate over its origins and significance has yielded little consensus among historians. Attempts to find the common characteristics that united the rebels or

[2] For a review of the scholarship on Bacon's Rebellion since the 1940s, see Brent Tarter, "Bacon's Rebellion, the Grievances of the People, and the Political Culture of Seventeenth-Century Virginia," *Virginia Magazine of History and Biography,* 119 (Jan. 2011), 2–41, esp. 6–9. For works unmentioned by Brent Tarter or that appeared after the publication of his essay, see Kathleen M. Brown, *Good Wives, Nasty Wenches, and Anxious Patriarchs: Gender, Race, and Power in Colonial Virginia* (Chapel Hill, 1996); Noeleen McIlvenna, *A Very Mutinous People: The Struggle for North Carolina, 1660–1713* (Chapel Hill, 2009), 46–70; Anthony S. Parent, *Foul Means: The Formation of a Slave Society in Virginia, 1660–1740* (Chapel Hill, 2003); Isaac Ariail Reed, "Charismatic Performance: A Study of Bacon's Rebellion," *American Journal of Cultural Sociology,* 1 (no. 2, 2013), 254–87; and James D. Rice, *Tales from a Revolution: Bacon's Rebellion and the Transformation of Early America* (New York, 2012). For Atlantic perspectives, see Stephen Saunders Webb, *1676: The End of American Independence* (New York, 1984); April Lee Hatfield, *Atlantic Virginia: Intercolonial Relations in the Seventeenth Century* (Philadelphia, 2004), 32–36; and Lauren Benton, *A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400–1900* (New York, 2010), 96–99. Bernard Bailyn, "Politics and Social Structure in Virginia," in *Seventeenth-Century America: Essays in Colonial History,* ed. James Morton Smith (Chapel Hill, 1959), 90–115; Warren M. Billings, "'Virginia's Deploured Condition,' 1660–1676: The Coming of Bacon's Rebellion" (Ph.D. diss., Northern Illinois University, 1968); Warren M. Billings, *Sir William Berkeley and the Forging of Colonial Virginia* (Baton Rouge, 2004); Warren M. Billings, "The Causes of Bacon's Rebellion: Some Suggestions," *Virginia Magazine of History and Biography,* 78 (Oct. 1970), 409–35; Warren M. Billings, "The Growth of Political Institutions in Virginia, 1634 to 1676," *William and Mary Quarterly,* 31 (April 1974), 225–42; Michael Leroy Oberg, *Dominion and Civility: English Imperialism and Native America* (Ithaca, 1999), 1–7. On "frontiersmen" versus "metropolitans," see *ibid*., 174–216. For nearly flawless transcriptions of large bodies of critically important sources that were previously difficult to access or were available only in error-ridden transcriptions, see Warren M. Billings, *The Papers of Sir William Berkeley, 1605–1677* (Richmond, 2007); and Warren M. Billings, *The Papers of Francis Howard, Baron Howard of Effingham, 1643–1695* (Richmond, 1989).

[3] Edmund S. Morgan, *American Slavery, American Freedom: The Ordeal of Colonial Virginia* (New York, 1975), esp. 6, 328, 344. For closely related interpretations, see Brown, *Good Wives, Nasty Wenches, and Anxious Patriarchs;* Alan Taylor, *American Colonies: The Settling of North America* (New York, 2001), 243; and Theodore W. Allen, *The Invention of the White Race* (2 vols., London, 1994–1997).

the loyalists have yielded inconclusive results, and even Morgan's thesis has begun to show some signs of wear (particularly regarding the timing and causes of Virginia's transition to slavery).[4]

On one key point however, scholars have achieved a consensus: Bacon's Rebellion was set off by a disagreement over how best to handle a conflict between Indians and colonists in the Potomac Valley. But beyond providing "the spark . . . leading to Bacon's Rebellion," what part did Indians play in the conflict? To what extent were Indians truly actors in the rebellion—people whose motives and actions shaped the course of events?[5]

The implicit answer offered by historians of colonial America is "not much." In most accounts, Indians, having inadvertently triggered an earthquake along an unstable and highly dangerous fault line within Virginia society, then stand off to the side while the colonists fight it out among themselves. Occasionally a group of Indians drops into the story, serves as a foil for Bacon's men, suffers at their hands, and drops out again. What Native Americans wanted, and how the relationships between different Indian nations shaped events, are not really part of the story; thus we learn little about any one group except its name and perhaps its location.[6]

Historians of Native America, for their part, have never fully brought their expertise to bear upon Bacon's Rebellion. Some writers, it is true, situate the rebellion in the context of white conquest, but that is not at all the same thing as giving full weight to specific Indian peoples' choices and actions. The few writers who do adopt a Native American–centered approach take an Iroquois-centric approach, noting the rebellion's significance for the Five Nations of the Iroquois Confederacy but not for the rest of Native America.

[4] On the inconclusive nature of the search for structural divisions underlying the rebellion, see Tarter, "Bacon's Rebellion, the Grievances of the People, and the Political Culture of Seventeenth-Century Virginia." On the inherent difficulty of classifying people as "rebels" or "loyalists" during a civil conflict, see Ronald Hoffman, "The 'Disaffected' in the Revolutionary South," in *The American Revolution: Explorations in the History of American Radicalism,* ed. Alfred F. Young (DeKalb, 1976), 273–313. For revisions to Edmund S. Morgan's chronology of and explanation for the rise of slavery, systemic racism, and white populism in Virginia, see John C. Coombs, "The Phases of Conversion: A New Chronology for the Rise of Slavery in Early Virginia," *William and Mary Quarterly,* 68 (July 2011), 332–60; John C. Coombs, "Beyond the 'Origins Debate': Rethinking the Rise of Virginia Slavery," in *Early Modern Virginia: Reconsidering the Old Dominion,* ed. Douglas Bradburn and John C. Coombs (Charlottesville, 2011), 240–78; Lorena S. Walsh, *Motives of Honor, Pleasure, and Profit: Plantation Management in the Colonial Chesapeake, 1607–1763* (Chapel Hill, 2010), 131–44, 194–210; Russell R. Menard, "British Migration to the Chesapeake Colonies in the Seventeenth Century," in *Colonial Chesapeake Society,* ed. Lois Green Carr, Philip D. Morgan, and Jean B. Russo (Chapel Hill, 1989), 99–132; Hatfield, *Atlantic Virginia,* 137–68; Philip D. Morgan, "Virginia's Other Prototype: The Caribbean," in *The Atlantic World and Virginia, 1550–1624,* ed. Peter C. Mancall (Chapel Hill, 2007), 342–80; and Nancy Shoemaker, *A Strange Likeness: Becoming Red and White in Eighteenth-Century North America* (New York, 2004).

[5] Washburn, *Governor and the Rebel,* 20. Virtually every writer on the subject has presented conflicts with Indians as the spark for Bacon's Rebellion. For the first historical analysis of the rebellion, published in 1705, see Robert Beverley, *The History and Present State of Virginia,* ed. Louis B. Wright (Chapel Hill, 1947), 74–78.

[6] Historians of Native America tend to confine Indians to the opening stages of the story and to later cameos when various groups cross paths with Nathaniel Bacon. See, for example, Washburn, *Governor and the Rebel;* Daniel K. Richter, *Facing East from Indian Country: A Native History of Early America* (Cambridge, Mass., 2003), 105–8; Daniel K. Richter, *Before the Revolution: America's Ancient Pasts* (Cambridge, Mass., 2011), 264–79; W. Stitt Robinson, *The Southern Colonial Frontier, 1607–1763* (Albuquerque, 1970), 61–67; and J. Leitch Wright Jr., *The Only Land They Knew: American Indians in the Old South* (Lincoln, 1981), 81–83, 88–90. Webb, *1676.* Stephen Saunders Webb boldly attempted to situate Bacon's Rebellion (and King Philip's War [1675–1676] in New England) within the context of developments in both Iroquoia and the English Atlantic, but historians have not found his interpretations convincing. See John Murrin, review of *1676: The End of American Independence* by Stephen Saunders Webb, *William and Mary Quarterly,* 43 (Jan. 1986), 119–24; and Wilcomb E. Washburn, "Stephen Saunders Webb's Interpretation of Bacon's Rebellion," *Virginia Magazine of History and Biography,* 95 (July 1987), 339–52.

Scholars of the Southeast have generally missed the significance of the rebellion altogether.[7]

In short, the burgeoning literature on Native American history and the long-running conversation about Bacon's Rebellion have not yet been adequately joined. What if they were joined, though? Rather than simply asking whether Indians played a "role" in the rebellion or had "agency," it is important to think in terms of "problems," or "tensions," and of their resolutions. This approach makes possible a more open-ended inquiry: What issues were at play during the rebellion, and how were they laid to rest? Is it possible that issues formulated and contested among Indians, as well as among colonists, had something to do with the causes of the rebellion, with the ways it was fought, and with its long-term consequences?

Dozens of Indian nations and several colonies were caught up, each in its own distinctive way, in the events surrounding Bacon's Rebellion. Although a full accounting of this complex situation is beyond the scope of this essay, we can at least begin to get a sense of how a continental perspective might alter our understanding of the rebellion, and of early America, by looking to the closely intertwined fates of Indian nations in three different regions. First, a focus on the Chesapeake Bay colonies' northern flank, with particular attention to the Susquehanna Valley and the Potomac Valley groups, does much to explain the origins of the rebellion. Second, adding an examination of how the rebellion played out among the "neighbor Indians" living within Virginia and Maryland aids in understanding the conduct of the rebellion (and thus in appreciating what it was truly about). Third, expanding the framework still further to include the southern Piedmont and mountains, with particular attention to the nations involved in the Indian slave trade in the Southeast—while still keeping one eye on the Five Nations and other northerners—reveals much about the consequences and lasting legacies of the rebellion.

Reframed to encompass Indian country, Bacon's Rebellion emerges yet again as a critical event in American history, albeit for different reasons than those previously advanced. From this perspective the rebellion appears to have been a manifestation of a much broader transformation, even a fundamental restructuring, of patterns of war, exchange, society, and diplomacy throughout eastern North America. It was rooted in troubles emanating primarily from within Indian country, and only secondarily from within Virginia. The real struggles—over primacy among the numerous Indian nations of the East and, simultaneously, over whether Indians or colonists would be the dominant power—were not resolved by the deaths of Bacon in 1676 and Berkeley in 1677. On the contrary, the issues in play during Bacon's Rebellion were not settled until the end of the seventeenth century,

[7] For Iroquois-centric approaches to Bacon's Rebellion, see Webb, *1676;* Neal Salisbury, "Native People and European Settlers in Eastern North America, 1600–1783," in *The Cambridge History of the Native Peoples of the Americas,* vol. I: *North America,* ed. Bruce G. Trigger and Wilcomb E. Washburn (New York, 1996), 399–460, esp. 421–22; and Francis Jennings, *The Ambiguous Iroquois Empire: The Covenant Chain Confederation of Indian Tribes with English Colonies from Its Beginnings to the Lancaster Treaty of 1744* (New York, 1984), 145–71. For a work that asserts that Virginia had little to do with events to the south of the colony, see Alan Gallay, *The Indian Slave Trade: The Rise of the English Empire in the American South, 1670–1717* (New Haven, 2002), 31. Others would not go so far as that, but neither have they gone so far as to develop a revised understanding of Bacon's Rebellion. See James H. Merrell, *The Indians' New World: Catawbas and Their Neighbors from European Contact through the Era of Removal* (New York, 1989), 40; Robbie Ethridge, "Creating the Shatter Zone: Indian Slave Traders and the Collapse of the Southeastern Chiefdoms," in *Light on the Path: The Anthropology and History of the Southeastern Indians,* ed. Thomas J. Pluckhahn et al. (Tuscaloosa, 2006), 207–18; Ian K. Steele, *Warpaths: Invasions of North America* (New York, 1995), 51–58; and Hatfield, *Atlantic Virginia,* 32–36. Helen C. Rountree briefly (necessarily so in a book covering 400 years) explores how the rebellion played out for Indians living within colonial settlements. See Helen C. Rountree, *Pocahontas's People: The Powhatan Indians of Virginia through Four Centuries* (Norman, 1990), 96–99.

when Baconite Indian policies finally prevailed and European economic expansion into the continental interior fueled an escalating cycle of wars, slave trading, epidemics, and migrations. Paradoxically, this cycle caused many Native Americans to disappear completely from the map while a small number of Indian nations actually derived strength from these developments.

The story of Bacon's Rebellion, as it has commonly been told, begins in the summer of 1675 with a petty trading dispute between the Potomac Valley merchant-planter Thomas Mathew and a group of Doeg Indians. This dispute occurred during a rough patch in the colony's history, when many Virginians were frustrated and looking for someone to blame: in recent years they had experienced a spike in taxes due to the expense of the Anglo-Dutch Wars of 1672–1674, while economic conditions, particularly for landless men and small planters (many of whom were former indentured servants), were in rapid decline.

The conflict between Mathew and the Doegs led to a series of retaliatory killings, culminating in September 1675 with the accidental murder of fourteen Susquehannock Indians by Virginia militia officers who mistook the Susquehannocks for Doegs. From there matters escalated into a general war with the Susquehannocks. The following spring, a difference of opinion among colonists about how best to conduct the Susquehannock War escalated into a civil war between forces led by the elderly William Berkeley, governor of Virginia since 1641, and a young rebel, the recently arrived James River planter Nathaniel Bacon.

Governor Berkeley wanted to maintain existing alliances with "neighbor Indians" while conducting the Susquehannock War. Bacon and his followers, conversely, blamed Indians for many of their problems and thought that Berkeley's policies coddled Indians at the expense of English colonists; they regarded the Susquehannock War as an opportunity to resolve all of their problems with Indians at one stroke. Against Berkeley's express orders, Bacon attacked a group of neighbor Indians. Berkeley declared Bacon a rebel and forced him to submit during a provincial assembly in June 1676. Bacon escaped, then reappeared in Jamestown, Virginia's capital, at the head of a volunteer army and forced Berkeley to give him a military commission to attack Indians. In July the rebels forced Berkeley to flee to the Eastern Shore, across the Chesapeake Bay from mainland Virginia. Jamestown repeatedly changed hands in the summer of 1676 and was burned to the ground by retreating rebel troops in September. Bacon died in October from an unspecified disease. His followers fought on until mid-January, when the last of them were captured or simply went home. The story typically ends with the arrival of a regiment of British regulars, accompanied by three royal commissioners sent to investigate the matter, which culminated in Governor Berkeley's disgrace and removal to London. Berkeley died there in July 1677 without ever having the opportunity to tell his side of the story to King Charles II.[8]

That, however, is not the story Indians would have told. Consider for example how a Susquehannock Indian, speaking of the events leading up to Bacon's Rebellion, would

[8] For a narrative of the rebellion, see Washburn, *Governor and the Rebel;* and Morgan, *American Slavery, American Freedom,* 250–70.



This map shows the Chesapeake Bay region in the 1675–1676 period. The events leading to Bacon's Rebellion took place within Native American territory and English settlements. *Courtesy Rebecca Wrenn.*

have explained its origins. A populous Iroquoian nation based primarily on the Susquehanna River in modern-day Pennsylvania, the Susquehannocks figure prominently in the records of colonial governments and of French Jesuit missionaries living among the Five Nations Iroquois, the Susquehannocks' neighbors to the north. As even the most conventional narratives of Bacon's Rebellion suggest, the Susquehannocks were very involved in the beginnings of the rebellion. It is therefore useful to ask: Would the social, racial, or political divisions among Virginians that dominate modern historical scholarship seem so important in a Susquehannock account? Or would a Susquehannock interlocutor have emphasized other events and other divisions?

A Susquehannock account of the origins of Bacon's Rebellion would start not with the English but rather with the Piscataways (located on the Potomac River near the Maryland settlements) and the Five Nations. The story would also begin in another century, because by 1675 the Susquehannocks had been intermittently at war with the Five Nations and the Piscataways for at least a century. The origins of this long conflict seem to lie in the convergence of several historical forces, including, most crucially, the creation of the Great League of the Iroquois in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and the end of chronic internecine feuding among the Five Nations. With peace established within the Great League of the Iroquois, Five Nations warriors redirected their efforts outward. The Susquehannocks, then occupying lands just to the south of the Five Nations, bore

the brunt of many of these attacks. Consequently the Susquehannocks gradually consolidated and shifted their settlements southward, first to the middle and lower reaches of the Susquehanna River, then to the upper Potomac basin in about 1575, and finally, in about 1610, back to the lower Susquehanna River near modern-day Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. There the Susquehannocks fell afoul of the Piscataways and other northern Chesapeake groups, with whom they frequently clashed and developed a deep-seated enmity. In short, the tension between the Susquehannocks and all but one of the groups that would later be their opponents during Bacon's Rebellion originated closer to 1575 than to 1675.[9]

Far from imposing their will upon the Susquehannocks and other Indian nations in the northern Chesapeake, the newly established English colonies of Virginia (founded in 1607) and Maryland (founded in 1634) were forced to choose sides so they could find a secure place within the Indians' well-established diplomatic configuration. Virginia sided with the Susquehannocks, and Maryland fell into the Piscataway orbit. The emergence in the 1620s of a northern Chesapeake Bay fur-trading connection with Virginia secretary of state William Claiborne was a critically important development for the Susquehannocks. Claiborne's trading post at Kent Island, in the upper Chesapeake Bay near modern-day Annapolis, Maryland, thrived as a result of the Susquehannock alliance. When the territory granted to the new colony of Maryland turned out to encompass Kent Island, the Susquehannocks joined Claiborne in resisting its absorption into Maryland. An additional irritation for Claiborne was that George Calvert (First Lord Baltimore), the head of the powerful Calvert family and the lord proprietor of Maryland, was a Catholic, as were many of his colonists. Like many Englishmen, Claiborne associated Catholicism with tyrannical and arbitrary rule, with weak elective bodies, and with England's great rival, France. The Susquehannocks, whose Five Nations enemies conspicuously harbored French Jesuit missionaries, may also have regarded Maryland's Catholics with suspicion, since Maryland too had Jesuit missionaries. During the 1630s and 1640s the Susquehannocks repeatedly attacked Maryland colonists, including the Jesuits among them. They also, of course, attacked their longtime Piscataway enemies and other Potomac Valley groups that had allied with Maryland for mutual defense against the Susquehannocks.[10]

That changed in the early 1650s. Claiborne, having backed what was at the time the winning side in the English Civil Wars (1642–1660), secured a commission to reduce Virginia and Maryland to Parliament's authority. Arriving in Maryland in March 1652, Claiborne's little navy quickly overwhelmed the small colony. Though the Susquehannocks did not participate in the assault, they accepted Claiborne's invitation to enter into a peace treaty with newly conquered Maryland, and by extension with the Piscataways and other native allies of Maryland. Although the colony reverted to the Calvert family in 1657, the treaty between the Susquehannocks and Maryland remained in force.[11]

The 1652 treaty with Maryland did not truly make the Susquehannocks friends with the Piscataways or with Maryland colonists, but it did give all parties a much-needed

[9] Daniel K. Richter, *The Ordeal of the Longhouse: The Peoples of the Iroquois League in the Era of European Colonization* (Chapel Hill, 1992), 30–49; James D. Rice, *Nature and History in the Potomac Country: From Hunter-Gatherers to the Age of Jefferson* (Baltimore, 2009), 47–70.

[10] J. Frederick Fausz, "Merging and Emerging Worlds: Anglo-Indian Interest Groups and the Development of the Seventeenth-Century Chesapeake," in *Colonial Chesapeake Society,* ed. Carr, Morgan, and Russo, 47–87; John D. Krugler, *English and Catholic: The Lords Baltimore in the Seventeenth Century* (Baltimore, 2008); Rice, *Nature and History in the Potomac Country,* 92–107.

[11] Fausz, "Merging and Emerging Worlds," 83–88.

respite. It provided the Susquehannocks security on their southern flank, which enabled them to focus on their Five Nations enemies to the north. Thanks in part to their alliances with Virginia and Maryland, they scored a number of victories against the Five Nations throughout the 1660s and into early 1670s. Nevertheless, the conflict was bleeding them to death. The Susquehannocks, reduced to perhaps three hundred warriors by the early 1670s, needed to cultivate alliances more than ever. They hosted a visit from the tayac (the Piscataways' hereditary chief), convinced Maryland's government to provide them with arms and ammunition, and developed relationships with Indian nations on the southern Piedmont.[12]

By 1673 the war had turned decisively against the Susquehannocks. French Jesuit missionaries among the Five Nations reported that the Iroquois had "utterly defeated" the Susquehannocks, "their ancient and most redoubtable foes." Maryland officials, who despite the 1652 treaty had never warmed to or fully trusted their former Susquehannock enemies, nevertheless invited the entire Susquehannock nation to move to Maryland. The Susquehannocks soon took up residence at an abandoned village at the mouth of Piscataway Creek, directly across the Potomac River from a newly patented property that would later become George Washington's Mount Vernon. On Piscataway Creek the Susquehannocks uneasily shared space on a reservation that had recently been created for the Piscataways and the tayac's tributary nations.[13]

The Susquehannocks' move to the Potomac cut through the thin veil of amity between them and the peoples of the Potomac, including colonists of Maryland, and re-exposed the deeper history of conflict between those groups. Even as the Susquehannocks were negotiating for possession of the town site at the mouth of Piscataway Creek, rumors spread among the colonists "of the many murthers and outrages comitted . . . by the Susquehanna Indians." Though false, these tales revealed how matters stood between the Susquehannocks and their southern neighbors. Even more revealingly, shortly after agreeing to seat the Susquehannocks along the Potomac, the Maryland Assembly proposed

[12] On conflict between the Susquehannocks and the Five Nations, see Richter, *Ordeal of the Longhouse,* 53, 60–65. The Susquehannocks' relations with Indians and colonists in the Delaware Valley are also an important part of their story. See Francis Jennings, "Glory, Death, and Transfiguration: The Susquehannock Indians in the Seventeenth Century," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society,* 112 (Feb. 1968), 15–53; and Cynthia Van Zandt, *Brothers among Nations: The Pursuit of Intercultural Alliances in Early America, 1580–1660* (New York, 2008), 166–86. Much of this struggle may be traced in Jesuit missionaries' annual "relation" documents written between 1661 and 1674. See Reuben Gold Thwaites, ed., *The Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents: Travels and Explorations of the Jesuit Missionaries in New France, 1610–1791* (73 vols., Cleveland, 1896–1901), XLIII, 143. "Relation of 1659–1660," *ibid.*, XLV, 241; "Relation of 1661–1662," *ibid.*, XLVII, 107, 111, 143; "Relation of 1662–1663," *ibid.*, XLVIII, 75–79; "Relation of 1667–1668," *ibid.*, LI, 231–33; "Relation of 1668–1669," *ibid.*, LII, 147, 155, 161, 167–71, 173, 175, 179, 197; "Relation of 1669–1670," *ibid.*, LIII, 243, 247, 251, 253, 291; "Relation of 1669–1670," *ibid.*, LIV, 58, 75; "Relation of 1670–1671," *ibid.*, LV, 35; "Relation of 1671–1672," *ibid.*, LVI, 35–37, 55–57; "Relation of 1672–1673," *ibid.*, LVII, 25, 169, 171; "Relation of 1673–1674," *ibid.*, LVIII, 227. See also "Proceedings of the General Assembly, Oct. 18, 1671," in *Archives of Maryland,* vol. II: *Proceedings and Acts of the General Assembly of Maryland, at a Session Held at St. Mary's, April 1666–June 1676,* ed. William Hand Browne (Baltimore, 1884), 319; "Proceedings of the Council of Maryland, July 20, 1670," in *Archives of Maryland,* vol. XV: *Proceedings of the Council of Maryland, 1671–1681,* ed. William Hand Browne (Baltimore, 1896), 291–92; and William Talbot, ed., *The Discoveries of John Lederer* (London, 1672), 11, 26.

[13] Claude Dablon, "État présent des Missions des pères de la Compagnie de Jésus en la Nouvelle-France, pendant l'année 1675" (Present state of missions of the Fathers of the Society of Jesus in New France during the year 1675), in *Jesuit Relations,* ed. Thwaites LIX, 245, 251. On the Maryland government's ambiguous attitude toward the Susquehannocks, see "Proceedings and Acts of the General Assembly, June 1, 1674," in *Archives of Maryland,* ed. Browne, II, 378; "Proceedings and Acts of the General Assembly, Feb. 17, 1674/75," *ibid.*, 425; and "Proceedings and Acts of the General Assembly, Feb. 19, 1674/75," *ibid.*, 428–30. On the Susquehannocks' relocation to Piscataway Creek, see Rice, *Nature and History in the Potomac Country,* 145–47; and Alice L. Ferguson, "The Susquehannock Fort on Piscataway Creek," *Maryland Historical Magazine,* 36 (March 1941), 1–9.

raising fifty thousand pounds of tobacco for peace negotiations with the Five Nations—or, if need be, for war against the Susquehannocks. Nothing came of that plan, but clearly the Susquehannocks could not trust their new neighbors. They could, however, count on being harassed by frontier planters and by the Piscataways and other Potomac nations, old enemies who had neither invited the Susquehannocks to live among them nor truly accepted them as allies.[14]

It was at this juncture, in the summer of 1675, that the herdsman Robert Hen, some twenty miles down the Potomac from the Susquehannocks, was slain by Doeg Indians in retaliation for an earlier clash over a debt owed to the Doegs by Hen's master, the Virginia planter Thomas Mathew. The following day a cabin full of unsuspecting Susquehannock hunters awoke to a surprise attack by Virginia militiamen, who killed fourteen of their number in reprisal for Hen's killing. (It was a case of mistaken identity: the Doegs who had killed Hen were in another cabin, only a few hundred yards away.) The Susquehannocks now faced a serious dilemma: How were they to respond to these murders without entering into a cycle of violence that might lead to their expulsion from their new tenuously held home in the Potomac Valley and the loss of their critically important alliances with Virginia and Maryland?[15]

The Susquehannocks chose, in essence, to return to an earlier era by revitalizing their long-term alliance with Virginia. They limited themselves to killing two Virginians and destroying some crops and livestock (because *some* response to the unprovoked murder of the fourteen hunters was needed), but followed up with a peace overture to Virginia. Their message to Governor Berkeley expressed grief that the Virginians had been "so eager in there groundless quarill" but assured him that they were "content to renew, and confirme the ancient League of amety" with Virginia. The suggestion was neither unreasonable nor unrealistic. Berkeley was not eager for a destructive and expensive war. (Maryland governor Charles Calvert, too, seemed more concerned about the threat to peaceable Indian relations than about the retaliatory killings of several of his colonists.)[16]

Contrary to Susquehannock expectations, however, Virginia chose war. The situation had changed since the heyday of the Susquehannock-Virginia alliance in the 1620s, 1630s, and 1640s. The Susquehannocks needed Virginia as much as ever, but in the blunt assessment of many colonists there was nothing to be gained by continuing the relationship. Thanks to a combination of militia officers' creative interpretations of instructions and political pressure from planters, by late September 1675 one thousand armed colonists from Virginia and Maryland had descended upon the Susquehannock fort on Piscataway Creek. Consistent with the long-term roots of the conflict, the militiamen were aided by men from nearby Indian nations for whom this was just the latest in a series of battles against the Susquehannocks.[17]

On the first full day of the siege the colonists seized and murdered five or six of the Susquehannocks' leading men who had left the fort under a flag of truce. This time the

[14] "An Act for Raysing a Present Supply for his Excettcy the Capt Generall to Defray the Charges of Making Peace with the Cynegoe Indians and Making Warr with the Susquehannes Indians and their Confederates if Accation Requires, Feb. 1674/75," in *Archives of Maryland,* ed. Browne, II, 462–63; Rice, *Nature and History in the Potomac Country,* 144–46.

[15] Washburn, *Governor and the Rebel,* 20–24.

[16] This summary actually understates the Susquehannocks' optimism, for by the time they made the peace overture several dozen additional colonists had been killed. "Remonstrance from the Chief of the Susquehannock," in *Papers of Sir William Berkeley,* ed. Billings, 499. William Berkeley to Thomas Ludwell, April 1, 1676, *ibid.*, 507–8; Berkeley to [Sir Joseph Williamson?], April 1, 1676, *ibid.*, 509.

[17] Washburn, *Governor and the Rebel,* 21–22.



An English observer made this sketch of the siege of a Susquehannock fort on the Potomac River in the autumn of 1675. *Courtesy National Archives of the United Kingdom.*

Susquehannocks' response was not so restrained. After a siege of six weeks in which many more colonists than Indians were killed, the entire Susquehannock community escaped. Most headed south to a refuge near the Virginia–North Carolina boundary. From there they launched a series of retaliatory attacks, forcing frontier planters to cluster in palisaded compounds or to retreat to more thickly settled parts of the colony. The most vigorous colonial response, a march against the Susquehannocks' hideout on the Roanoke River,led by the James River planter Nathaniel Bacon, was in defiance of the orders of Governor Berkeley. It soon led to the conflict within Virginia that bore Bacon's name.[18]

What, then, from a Susquehannock point of view, were the causes of Bacon's Rebellion? From this angle of vision, differences among Virginians do not loom large. The long-term struggles against the Piscataways and the Five Nations come to the fore, and actors and relationships that do not normally figure in accounts of the rebellion seem much more important. Events in the northern Chesapeake mattered more than events along Virginia's James and York Rivers, where most colonists lived. From where the Susquehannocks were standing, Bacon and his followers did not register as insurgents

[18] *Ibid.*, 22–48.

against an unpopular governor—Bacon and Berkeley both sought to destroy the Susquehannocks, betraying the colony's longtime ally at the worst possible moment. Thus Bacon's march against the Susquehannocks' stronghold in the southern Piedmont in the spring of 1676 did not appear as a critical moment in his struggle against Governor Berkeley, but as yet another episode in what even many colonists called the Susquehannock War.

Yet as the Occaneechees, Pamunkeys, and other neighbor Indians could attest, there was a major difference between the governor and the rebel. Berkeley wanted to fight only Susquehannocks, while the Baconites wished to rid Virginia of all Indians. The Susquehannock War was crucial to bringing out this rift among the colonists, for it mobilized anti-Indian sentiment throughout Virginia in a way that the localized conflict with the Doegs never could. None of the numerous clashes between neighbor Indians and colonists in recent decades had polarized colonists as the Susquehannock War did.[19]

What, then, was so special about the Susquehannocks? Simply put, they were the only Indian nation within the Chesapeake region that could generate sufficient fear and panic throughout the colony for Bacon to turn the Susquehannock War into a general war against the Indians. The Susquehannocks were more numerous than most of the neighbor Indians, and their warriors were seasoned veterans of their long-term conflicts with the Five Nations and with southern nations such as the Piscataways. Their settlements lay beyond the reach of the colonists, and they were able to strike almost anywhere in Virginia or Maryland except the Eastern Shore. Above all, the Susquehannocks' deeply felt sense of betrayal at the hands of their Virginia allies, and their sense of desperation and isolation given their recent misfortunes, inspired them to launch more deadly attacks in more places than the colonists had experienced since the Anglo-Powhatan War of 1644—a conflict that the vast majority of colonists knew only as a historical event. Susquehannock raids extended from the falls of the James River in the south, where Bacon and other planters had members of their households killed by Susquehannock warriors, to Maryland in the north. In the face of such a formidable enemy colonists retreated from the more exposed plantations, built fortifications for local defense, and speculated about potential collaborations between their closest Indian neighbors and the Susquehannocks. These conditions were uniquely conducive to an appeal such as Bacon's.[20]

Bacon's Rebellion, then, was the product of both an accident—the Virginians' inadvertent attack on the sleeping Susquehannock hunters—and of a long regional history of intra-Indian war and diplomacy that made the Susquehannocks the most desperate and formidable enemy that Virginians had faced in over thirty years. That regional history was primarily structured not by social or political divisions among the English, but rather by the Susquehannocks' relationships with the Five Nations and the Piscataways. Unfortunately for the Susquehannocks, the Piscataways and the Five Nations Iroquois remembered that history well, and they sensed opportunity in the Susquehannocks' falling-out

[19] Edward DuBois Ragan, "'Scatter'd upon the English Seats': Indian Identity and Land Occupancy in the Rappahannock River Valley," in *Early Modern Virginia,* ed. Bradburn and Coombs, 215–25; Rice, *Nature and History in the Potomac Country,* 108–49; Rountree, *Pocahontas's People,* 89–127.

[20] Many colonists, aware of King Philip's War raging in New England, feared an even more widespread Indian combination against the colonies. See Wilcomb E. Washburn, "Governor Berkeley and King Philip's War," *New England Quarterly,* 30 (Sept. 1957), 363–77.



This map depicts eastern North America in the 1672–1705 period. The issues central to Bacon's Rebellion were contested not only within Virginia but also among other English colonies and Native American communities throughout the region. *Courtesy Rebecca Wrenn.*

with their longtime Virginia allies. They, rather than Bacon's "volunteers," remained the Susquehannocks' greatest military threat.

Indians were also central actors in the conduct of Bacon's Rebellion, which was neither two-sided (the governor vs. the rebel), nor three-sided (the governor vs. the rebel vs. the Indians), but rather a multisided conflict in which most of the "sides" lay within Indian country. On Virginia's northern flank the rebellion played out within the same enduring Native American diplomatic framework that Virginians and Marylanders had encountered when their colonies were first established. On the colony's southern flank, however, the Baconites found themselves operating within a newer and even more complex Native American diplomatic constellation.

The southern Piedmont had become a strategically important region for the Virginia colony in recent years, largely in response to changes in patterns of war, diplomacy, and exchange among Indian nations there. The fulcrum of Virginia's Indian trade had shifted after 1650 from the northern Chesapeake Bay to the falls of the Appomattox and James Rivers, which was the best launching point for trading on the southern Piedmont. South-

ern deerskins and Indian slaves (captives taken in wars between Indian nations) replaced northern beaver pelts as the traders' most desired commodities. In the 1670s the number of Virginians competing for this southern trade was rising sharply.[21]

Southern Indians and Virginians who were interested in trading with one another had to reckon with the Occaneechees, whose well-fortified town on an island at a shallow ford across the Roanoke River was an important way station on the main north-south trading path across the Piedmont. Only with difficulty were southern Indians able to bypass the Occaneechees to trade directly with the Virginians. Indeed, other Native Americans in the region learned to speak the Occaneechees' language so that they could join in the Virginia trade. The Occaneechees used their position to obtain English guns and ammunition, which further strengthened their hand.[22]

Other Indian nations nevertheless competed with the Occaneechees, giving Virginia traders alternative sources of slaves, pelts, and skins: the Tuscaroras, for example, who lived to the southeast of the Occaneechees near the Carolina coast, and the much-feared Richahecrians or "Westos," migrants from the north who since the 1660s had been raiding Indian and Spanish mission towns as far south as Florida and as far west as the Appalachian Mountains. The Westos found the slave trade so lucrative that after a brief stay at the falls of the James River during the 1650s they decided to move closer to their victims. They took up new lands four hundred miles to the south on the Savannah River but maintained their connections with Virginia traders.[23]

In the winter of 1675–1676 the Occaneechees gained a new neighbor and potential trading rival: the Susquehannocks, who, after their November escape from the siege of their fort on the Potomac River, settled on the Roanoke River just above the Occaneechees' island. The Susquehannocks' presence on the southern Piedmont was awkward and unsettling from the outset. Although the precise nature of the conflicts was never spelled out in the English records, word soon spread that the Susquehannocks had run afoul of "the other lesser nations of the Indians and so made them their Enimies."[24]

The Susquehannocks were well aware of their precarious situation and their dire need for friends. In the winter of 1675–1676 they approached Edmund Andros, governor of New York and New Jersey, about returning to the north. A few Susquehannocks came and planted corn in the Delaware Valley that spring. Mostly, though, the Susquehannocks sought Indian allies in the south. And where better to begin than with their closest and most powerful neighbors, the Occaneechees? The Susquehannocks' overtures failed utterly, however. Faced with a choice between their English trading partners and the Susque-

[21] C. S. Everett, "'They Shalbe Slaves for Their Lives': Indian Slavery in Colonial Virginia," in *Indian Slavery in Colonial America,* ed. Alan Gallay (Lincoln, 2009), 67–107; Paul Kelton, *Epidemics and Enslavement: Biological Catastrophe in the Native Southeast, 1492–1715* (Lincoln, 2007), 101–26; Martin H. Quitt, "William Byrd," *Dictionary of Virginia Biography,* vol. II: *Bland through Cannon,* ed. Sara B. Bearss et al. (Richmond, 2001), 463–66; Alan Vance Briceland, *Westward from Virginia: The Exploration of the Virginia-Carolina Frontier, 1650–1710* (Charlottesville, 1987); Merrell, *Indians' New World,* 36–37.

[22] Hatfield, *Atlantic Virginia,* 24–33; Merrell, *Indians' New World,* 28–29, 59–61.

[23] Everett, "'They Shalbe Slaves for Their Lives'"; Eric E. Bowne, *The Westo Indians: Slave Traders of the Early Colonial South* (Tuscaloosa, 2005), 89–114; Maureen Meyers, "From Refugees to Slave Traders: The Transformation of the Westo Indians," in *Mapping the Mississippian Shatter Zone: The Colonial Indian Slave Trade and Regional Instability in the American South,* ed. Robbie Ethridge and Sheri M. Shuck-Hall (Lincoln, 2009), 81–103; Robin A. Beck Jr., "Catawba Coalescence and the Shattering of the Carolina Piedmont, 1540–1675," *ibid.*, 115–41.

[24] Berkeley to [Williamson?], April 1, 1676, in *Papers of Sir William Berkeley,* ed. Billings, 509. Philip Ludwell to Williamson, June 28, 1676, in "Bacon's Rebellion," *Virginia Magazine of History and Biography,* 1 (Oct. 1893), 167–86, esp. 180; Michael Leroy Oberg, ed., *Samuel Wiseman's* Book of Record: *The Official Account of Bacon's Rebellion in Virginia, 1676–1677* (Lanham, 2005), 146.

hannock newcomers, the Occaneechees sent messengers to tell the English where they might find the Susquehannocks.[25]

As the Susquehannocks surely realized, many colonists in the winter and spring of 1676 were calling for an indiscriminate war of extermination against Indians. In March the anti-Indian forces found their leader in Bacon, who accepted the leadership of a band of "volunteers" gathering on the upper James River. Bacon represented their position in an increasingly heated exchange of letters with Berkeley. The governor warned Bacon that he was in mutiny and ordered him to come to Jamestown. Bacon insisted that he desired "ever to be esteemed by your Honor as a loyall subject," but made excuses for staying away. The frontiers needed guarding, and the Indians living within the Virginia settlements especially bore watching. After all, asked the Baconites, "Are not the Indians all of a Colour"? Berkeley laid plans for arresting the rebellious Bacon. Thus the Occaneechees' message revealing the location of the Susquehannock refugees was, for Bacon and his followers, very timely. On May 2 Bacon struck out on an unauthorized expedition at the head of over one hundred "volunteers" to find and destroy the Susquehannocks.[26]

Some days later the Occaneechees greeted Bacon at the north bank of the Roanoke River opposite their town. Posseclay, the Occaneechees' chief, gave the Virginians a warm welcome and, after the Virginians had refreshed themselves, he revealed that the Susquehannocks had two forts nearby. One, five miles distant, was inhabited by at least thirty warriors plus women and children, along with a smaller number of Manakin and Annalectin warriors (from nearby Piedmont nations) whom the Susquehannocks had pressured into joining them. Another fort, ten miles away, contained "a very considerable number of men besides woeman and children." Bacon was eager to attack, but Posseclay insisted that "your men are weary, and want sleep, and [are] not fitt for service." The Virginians, Posseclay said, should "stay and Rest heer, and wee will Goe and take the Fort for you and bring you an account of it."[27]

The Occaneechees plotted with the Manakin and Annalectin warriors within one of the forts to turn against the Susquehannocks. Leaving behind the "weary and faint" Virginians, the Occaneechees attacked several days later. At their signal the Manakins and Annalectins turned against their Susquehannock hosts, killing many of the town's 150 inhabitants. Returning "with triumph" to the Virginians' encampment, the Occaneechees displayed the scalp of the Susquehannocks' "King" and brought seven Susquehannock prisoners as a gift to Bacon, then tortured and killed them at his request. They also carried

[25] Jennings, *Ambiguous Iroquois Empire,* 149; William Sherwood, "Virginia's Deploured Condition," Aug. 9, 1676, in *Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society, Fourth Series* (10 vols., Boston, 1871), IX, 167; Ludwell to Williamson, June 28, 1676, in "Bacon's Rebellion," 180.

[26] Berkeley to Nathaniel Bacon, May 2, 1676, in *Papers of Sir William Berkeley,* ed. Billings, 517; "Proclamation Suspending Nathaniel Bacon from Office," May 10, 1676, *ibid.*, 517–19; "Election Writ by William Berkeley given this 10th day of May in Henrico County," May 10, 1676, *ibid.*, 520–21; Bacon to Berkeley, May 26, 1676, *ibid.*, 523–24; "Affidavit of Sir William Berkeley, Sir Henry Chicheley, the Reverend John Clough, and James Crews," May 26, 1676, *ibid.*, 524–25; Bacon to Berkeley, May 28, 1676, *ibid.*, 525; "Opinion of the Council of State, 29 May 1676," *ibid.*, 525–26; "Declaration and Remonstrance of Sir William Berkeley," May 29, 1676, *ibid.*, 526–28; Bacon to Berkeley, ca. May 1676, *ibid.*, 528–29; Bacon to Berkeley, ca. May 1676, *ibid.*, 529–30; Bacon to Berkeley, ca. May 1676, *ibid.*, 530–31. Oberg, *Samuel Wiseman's* Book of Record, 148.

[27] Ludwell to Williamson, June 28, 1676, in "Bacon's Rebellion," 180, 181; Sherwood, "Virginia's Deploured Condition," 166–67; "Nathaniel Bacon's Victory over the Indians, April 1676," in *The Old Dominion in the Seventeenth Century: A Documentary History of Virginia, 1606–1700,* ed. Warren M. Billings (Chapel Hill, 2007), 330–33. Posseclay is called Persicles in some sources.

home a small mountain of captured beaver pelts, which they stowed away in their own fort.[28]

To the Occaneechees' surprise, their feat was not enough. Bacon pestered the Occaneechees to turn over the beaver pelts taken from the Susquehannock fort. Posseclay insisted that his men had done all of the work and therefore should have all of the plunder. The wrangling wore on for hours until finally, after midnight, shots rang out and the battle began. By the next afternoon over one hundred Occaneechees lay dead, and their town was in ruins. The survivors hid in the woods until the Virginians left, then retreated southward to a new settlement near what is now Chapel Hill, North Carolina. Bacon's volunteers rode in the opposite direction, northward to Virginia. Once there Bacon touted the destruction of the Occaneechees' town as "a greater victory from a sharper conflict than ever yett has been known in these parts of the world."[29]

At this point it becomes useful, for comparison's sake, to step outside of the Native American framework to review the highlights of the intra-Virginian civil war that followed Bacon's return from the Occaneechees' island. As a number of historians have narrated, Bacon arrived home just in time to participate in the elections for a new assembly, called for by Berkeley during Bacon's absence and scheduled to open in early June. Over the next few months Bacon was elected as a burgess for Henrico County, arrested upon his arrival at Jamestown for the opening of the June provincial assembly, pardoned after tendering humble apologies, escaped from Jamestown, and returned in late June at the head of several hundred men to compel Berkeley to grant him a military commission. In July Bacon forced Berkeley and his supporters to flee to the Eastern Shore. The rebels briefly lost control of the capital in early September, expelled Berkeley's men from Jamestown a second time on September 19, then burned the capital city to the ground as the loyalists evacuated again to the Eastern Shore. Bacon died on October 26, most likely of typhus compounded by dysentery. A grinding partisan war ensued, with the loyalists only completing their victory in mid-January 1677.[30]

Often glossed over in this narrative is that the rebels spent far more time in the field against Indians than they did against Berkeley's forces. Bacon insisted all along that his targets were Indians, and his actions generally bore that out. The "volunteers," he promised, would not bear arms against the governor unless he attacked Bacon's forces from the rear while they were out fighting Indians. This struck the right note with many Virginians, most of whom agreed not to hinder Bacon in this task. True to his word, after forcing a commission from Berkeley to go out against the Indians at the end of June, Bacon left Berkeley still in control of the government at Jamestown. Bacon assembled a volunteer army at the falls of the James River, hoping to go out again in search of the Susquehannocks. Only after Berkeley tried to raise forces against the rebels did Bacon turn back

[28] Ludwell to Williamson, June 28, 1676, in "Bacon's Rebellion," 181; "Nathaniel Bacon's Victory over the Indians," 330–32, esp. 331; T. M. [Thomas Mathew], "The Beginning, Progress, and Conclusion of Bacon's Rebellion, 1675–1676," in *Narratives of the Insurrections, 1675–1690,* ed. Charles M. Andrews (New York, 1915), 14–41, esp. 21; Sherwood, "Virginia's Deploured Condition," 167–68. The figure of 150 dead Susquehannocks is based on an estimated 3:1 or 4:1 ratio between the nonwarrior and warrior populations.

[29] "Nathaniel Bacon's Victory over the Indians," 332; Sherwood, "Virginia's Deploured Condition," 168; Ludwell to Williamson, June 28, 1676, in "Bacon's Rebellion," 181–82; "Mr. Bacon's Acct of Their Troubles in Virginia by ye Indians, June ye 18th, 1676," in "Bacon's Rebellion," *William and Mary Quarterly,* 9 (July 1900), 1–10, esp. 7; R. Stephen Davis et al., eds., *Excavating Occaneechi Town: Archaeology of an Eighteenth-Century Indian Village in North Carolina* (Chapel Hill, 1998).

[30] Craven, *Southern Colonies in the Seventeenth Century,* 360–93; Washburn, *Governor and the Rebel,* 48–91; Morgan, *American Slavery, American Freedom,* 250–70; Webb, *1676,* 79–127.

to Jamestown, driving the governor out of the capital in late July and establishing a provisional government in his absence.[31]

Bacon began to fight Indians in earnest after Berkeley retreated to the Eastern Shore in July 1676. Deciding that the Susquehannocks and the Occaneechees were beyond his army's reach in the vast southern interior, Bacon turned against the Pamunkeys and other nations within the Virginia settlements. Even this proved more difficult than he anticipated when the Pamunkeys retreated into the thick woods and swamps north of the York River and for many weeks could not be found by Bacon's increasingly tired and exasperated troops. Most of his men had already gone home by the time Bacon finally stumbled upon the Pamunkeys' camp in early September, taking numerous prisoners and forcing their hereditary chief, Cockacoeske, to surrender a few days later.[32]

Having at last achieved some success against the Pamunkeys, Bacon returned to his headquarters (Governor Berkeley's splendid Green Spring Plantation, near Jamestown) and sent all but a few of his men home to recuperate. It was then that Berkeley returned from the Eastern Shore and recaptured Jamestown without firing a shot. Bacon hastily recalled his men and laid siege to the capital, expelling the loyalists after some intense maneuvering and fighting. The siege lasted eleven days, a mere fraction of the time that Virginians had already spent afield against the Susquehannocks, Occaneechees, Pamunkeys, and the many other neighbor Indians who were being persecuted by their neighbors in local areas throughout Virginia. Revealingly, as soon as Bacon finished mopping up the loyalist resistance in the wake of Governor Berkeley's return to the Eastern Shore in mid-September Bacon once again gathered his volunteers and went into the woods and swamps in search of Indians. True to the central goal of the rebels to the end, Bacon died in late October while campaigning against Indians, not against loyalists.[33]

Even the foregoing account, however, fails to capture the extent to which Native Americans, rather than Virginians, determined the conduct of Bacon's Rebellion. The Pamunkeys and other neighbor Indians ran Bacon's men ragged by drawing them into thick woods and wetlands where they exhausted their energy and supplies and rarely encountered Indians. Thus did Virginia's Indian allies largely preserved themselves despite Bacon's best efforts to annihilate them. In the process they profoundly shaped the civil war within Virginia by ensuring that the rebels were not at their best when they turned to fight the loyalists.[34]

Moreover, the enduring diplomatic alignment among indigenous nations in the northern Chesapeake also determined the conduct of Bacon's Indian war. Although the Virginians (rebels and loyalists alike) had rejected the Susquehannock alliance, almost everyone else (notably Maryland, the Piscataways and their tributaries, the Five Nations, and the Susquehannocks) followed a script straight out of the sixteenth century (or, for Maryland, from the 1630s). While Bacon's followers refused to distinguish between Indian

[31] "Proclamations of Nathaniel Bacon," *Virginia Magazine of History and Biography,* 1 (July 1893), 55–61; Oberg, *Samuel Wiseman's* Book of Record, 156–58; "The History of Bacon's and Ingram's Rebellion, 1676," in *Narratives of the Insurrections,* ed. Andrews, 60–62.

[32] Sherwood, "Virginia's Deploured Condition," 175–77; Oberg, *Samuel Wiseman's* Book of Record, 158–61, 181–82; T. M.[Mathew], "Beginning, Progress, and Conclusion of Bacon's Rebellion," 38.

[33] Washburn, *Governor and the Rebel,* 77–85.

[34] The Pamunkeys were not the only neighbor Indians driven underground during Bacon's Rebellion. See "The Indians of Southern Virginia, 1650–1711, Depositions in the Virginia and North Carolina Boundary Case," *Virginia Magazine of History and Biography,* 8 (July 1900), 6, 9; Ragan, "'Scatter'd upon the English Seats'," 225–26; Rice, *Nature and History in the Potomac Country,* 149–51; and Rountree, *Pocahontas's People,* 96–99.

nations, Native Americans experienced no such difficulties. They clearly distinguished their friends from their enemies.

Thus the Susquehannock War continued unabated throughout Bacon's Rebellion, carried on by Indians—particularly the Five Nations, the Piscataways, and the Piscataways' tributaries—whose rocky relations with the Susquehannocks considerably predated 1675. The Five Nations, aware that some Susquehannocks had taken refuge along the Delaware River and that others were returning to the Susquehanna Valley in the wake of their defeat by the Occaneechees in the spring of 1676, repeatedly threatened the Susquehannocks with annihilation and captivity that summer, while also making serious diplomatic overtures using New York governor Edmund Andros as their intermediary. Both approaches, it seems, were part of a larger design to at long last destroy the Susquehannocks as an independent nation and absorb its population into their own.[35]

The Piscataways' and the Marylanders' approach was less subtle than that of the Five Nations, but no less true to form. Maryland stuck by its Piscataway allies, shielding them from unprovoked attacks by Baconites and supporting the Piscataways as they seized the opportunity to attack the Susquehannocks. Although the details of the fighting between the Piscataways and the Susquehannocks were not recorded by colonial observers, by May 1676 the Piscataways had already so earned the gratitude of Maryland's government that the assembly voted to reward their efforts with 130 barrels of corn, sixty pounds of powder, two hundred pounds of shot, and over one hundred matchcoats (bolts of high-quality trading cloth). The Mattawomans, a tributary nation to the Piscataways, earned additional rewards. When Maryland considered opening peace talks with the Susquehannocks in the spring of 1677 the Piscataways protested, making it clear that they would rather "march with the English to the new Fort [the Susquehannocks] have built, or otherwise to pursue the Susquehanoughs" as they retreated to the north.[36]

By then, however, officials in Virginia and Maryland wanted peace. The last of the rebel forces disbanded on January 18, and later that month the first ships carrying British troops arrived along with royal commissioners appointed to sort out the mess caused by the rebellion. Disgraced, Berkeley was recalled to England. In May 1677 the royal commissioners negotiated the Treaty of Middle Plantation, in which the Pamunkeys and other Indian nations within Virginia agreed to accept Charles II as their sovereign and to fight alongside Virginians against "forreigne" Indians whenever they were asked. In return, the commissioners, confessing that the conflict had begun with their own peoples' "violent Intrusions" against Indians, confirmed Native American possession of their lands and their customary fishing, gathering, and hunting rights.

[35] "Proceedings of the Council of Maryland, August 6, 1676," in *Archives of Maryland,* ed. Browne, XV, 120–22; Edmund Cantwell to Edmund Andros, May 11, 1676, in *New York Historical Manuscripts: Dutch,* vols. XX–XXI: *Delaware Papers (Dutch Period): A Collection of Documents Pertaining to the Regulation of Affairs on the South River of New Netherland, 1648–1664,* ed. Kenneth Scott and Kenn Stryker-Rodda and trans. Arnold J. F. Van Laer (Baltimore, 1977), 104, 112; Andros to Deputy Governor of Maryland, Sept. 25, 1676, in *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York,* ed. E. B. O'Callaghan and B. Fernow (15 vols., Albany, 1853–1887), XII, 558; "Minutes of Interviews between the Governor and Susquehanna Indians," June 2, 1676, *ibid.*, XIII, 497–98; Jennings, "Glory, Death, and Transfiguration," 36–39; Rice, *Tales from a Revolution,* 54–55.

[36] "Proceedings of the General Assembly, May 24, 1676," in *Archives of Maryland,* ed. Browne, II, 488–89; "Instructions for Coll. Henry Coursey in Execution of his Comission for Treaty with the Susquesahannohs & Cinnigo Indians," in *Archives of Maryland,* vol. V: *Proceedings of the Council of Maryland, 1667–1668,* ed. William Hand Browne (Baltimore, 1889), 245, 247; "Proceedings of the Council, Nov. 3 and Nov. 20, 1675," *ibid.*, XV, 56–58; "Proceedings of the Council, June 7, 1676," *ibid.*, 78; "Proceedings of the Council, Aug. 17, 1676," *ibid.*, 126.

Although the Treaty of Middle Plantation acknowledged natives' distinctive status and even their usefulness to Virginia, it was a major step in the colony's conquest of the nations within.[37]

A second 1677 treaty, negotiated by Maryland, New York, and the Five Nations at Albany shortly after the Treaty of Middle Plantation, introduced major changes to the historic diplomatic configuration of the northern Chesapeake. An initial modification of this system, the severing of the Susquehannock-Virginia alliance, had been accomplished in 1675. Now, by the Albany Treaty of 1677, the Susquehannocks were allowed to return north as dependents of the Iroquois; thus two of the region's major antagonists were finally reconciled. Yet the transformation was not complete. The Albany Treaty also established peace (on paper at least) among the English colonies, the Five Nations, and their respective Indian allies, including the Iroquois, the Susquehannocks, and the Piscataways. If all had followed the terms of the treaty in the long term, the diplomatic framework that had structured relations in the region since the sixteenth century would have been completely dismantled. Of course, that did not happen.[38]

Neither Bacon's death in October 1676, nor the two Indian treaties of 1677, nor Berkeley's death in July 1677 could resolve the issues that had sparked Bacon's Rebellion. The dilemmas that lay at the heart of the conflict remained: for the "neighbor Indians," how to survive; for the Occaneechees, how to hold their own amid the southern Piedmont's intra-Indian wars, Indian slavery, migrations, and consolidations, which were intensifying with the rapid expansion of the European economy into Indian country; and for the Iroquois and their new Susquehannock clients, how to hold their own against other northern nations, continue their raids against the Piscataways and other southern nations without also becoming enmeshed in a war with the English, and maintain peace with the English without losing their autonomy. Among colonial elites the challenge was to relieve the pressures caused by planters' frustrations with the state of the colony—heavy war-related taxes, many Virginians' perceived political powerlessness, labor shortages, and other political and economic problems—without resorting to another expensive and divisive Indian war that might lead to still more strife within Virginia society.

The resolutions to these conflicts, as they unfolded over the next quarter century, came almost entirely at the expense of Indians. Bacon's Rebellion marked the beginning of a sharp decline in the ability of most Indian nations on the Eastern Seaboard to significantly shape events, including not only among neighbor Indians such as the Pamunkeys and Piscataways but also more among distant nations such as the Occaneechees and Westos. At the end of the seventeenth century the balance shifted when Native American power and autonomy rapidly (though far from entirely) eroded.

The forces that would eventually bring about this transition had already been set in motion by the end of 1677: first, a rapid expansion of the Indian slave trade in the Southeast; second, a tacit, though temporary, postrebellion compromise among Virginians over Indian policy; and third, the initial stirrings of a sense among colonists that a vast, even

[37] Oberg, *Samuel Wiseman's* Book of Record, 134–41, esp. 135, 136; Rountree, *Pocahontas's People,* 100–103.

[38] "A Proclamation in Maryland of a Peace with the Indians," April 15, 1678, in *Archives of Maryland,* ed. Browne, V, 269–70; Richter, *Ordeal of the Longhouse,* 190–235.

cosmic, conspiracy between Indians and Catholics was underway. These forces culminated in the Glorious Revolution of 1688–1689, which cleared the way for a more lasting postrebellion settlement. Although some Indian nations continued to significantly shape events and even to thrive in the wake of Bacon's Rebellion, it was increasingly common for English fantasies about Indian power, rather than actual Indians, to drive events. With a few important exceptions, by the early eighteenth century Indian power and autonomy in the region was reduced to a fraction of what it had been in 1675. Native Americans' options, even for relatively successful nations, became correspondingly fewer and less palatable.

Virginia's involvement in the Indian slave trade accelerated as a consequence of Bacon's Rebellion. In the 1650s and 1660s the Virginia Assembly had placed restrictions on the enslavement of Indians, though these were often evaded. During Bacon's Rebellion, however, numerous Occaneechees, Pamunkeys, and other Indians were seized and sold into servitude. Provincial officials seized upon these wartime circumstances to legitimize the expansion of Indian slavery, first in a 1676 statute and then in a provision of the Treaty of Middle Plantation. After the rebellion, the void left by the Occaneechees' abandonment of their choice location astride the main trading path into the southern Piedmont meant that Virginians could trade more freely with other groups.[39]

Fortuitously for the Virginia traders, the removal of impediments to the Indian slave trade came at a moment when an accelerating cycle of warfare, epidemics, and rivalries between European powers was producing a sharp increase in the number of Indian captives available for sale into slavery within Virginia and the West Indies. By the turn of the eighteenth century Indian slave raids for English markets had spread from the Carolinas to Florida and the Mississippi River; all told, thirty thousand to fifty thousand southern Indians were enslaved by the British between 1670 and 1715. Entire peoples disappeared or were absorbed into more successful nations and confederacies, such as the Creeks, Catawbas, Cherokees, and Yamasees. Gaping holes in the map opened up as places once inhabited by numerous small nations became buffer zones between a more limited number of large nations.[40]

This late seventeenth-century expansion in the Indian slave trade coincided with a period when planters were struggling to find a reliable source of unfree labor to sustain the colony's tobacco economy. The quantity and quality of white indentured servants available to planters had greatly declined since the 1650s, thanks to improved economic conditions in England and increased opportunities for English migrants in other colo-

[39] Everett, "'They Shalbe Slaves for Their Lives'"; Kelton, *Epidemics and Enslavement,* 108–15.

[40] Robbie Ethridge, *From Chicaza to Chickasaw: The European Invasion and the Transformation of the Mississippian World, 1540–1715* (Chapel Hill, 2010), 149–93; Kelton, *Epidemics and Enslavement,* 101–220; Joel W. Martin, "Southeastern Indians and the English Trade in Skins and Slaves," in *The Forgotten Centuries: Indians and Europeans in the American South, 1521–1704,* ed. Charles Hudson and Carmen Chaves Tesser (Athens, Ga., 1994), 304–24; James H. Merrell, "'Our Bond of Peace': Patterns of Intercultural Exchange in the Carolina Piedmont, 1650–1750," in *Powhatan's Mantle: Indians in the Colonial Southeast,* ed. Gregory A. Waselkov, Peter H. Wood, and M. Thomas Hatley (Lincoln, 2006), 267–304; Merrell, *Indians' New World,* 36–37, 66; William L. Ramsey, *The Yamasee War: A Study of Culture, Economy, and Conflict in the Colonial South* (Lincoln, 2008); Owen Stanwood, "Captives and Slaves: Indian Labor, Cultural Conversion, and the Plantation Revolution in Virginia," *Virginia Magazine of History and Biography,* 114 (Dec. 2006), 434–63; "Indian Slaves," *William and Mary Quarterly,* 6 (April 1898), 214–15; and "Indian Slaves," *ibid.,* 8 (Jan. 1900), 165. On the broader phenomenon of Indian slavery, see Gallay, *Indian Slave Trade;* Michael Guasco, "To 'Doe Some Good upon Their Countrymen': The Paradox of Indian Slavery in Early Anglo-America," *Journal of Social History,* 41 (Winter 2007), 389–411; Brett Rushforth, *Bonds of Alliance: Indigenous and Atlantic Slaveries in New France* (Chapel Hill, 2012); and Christina Snyder, *Slavery in Indian Country: The Changing Face of Captivity in Early America* (Cambridge, Mass., 2010).

nies. The demand for enslaved Africans far outstripped the supply, a situation that would change only at the very end of the 1690s. Thus Indian slaves provided a critical bridge between a seventeenth-century labor system dominated by white indentured servants and an eighteenth-century society founded upon the labor of enslaved Africans. Between 1670 and 1700 on the upper James River 40 percent of the slaves were Indians. Enslaved children in particular were disproportionately Indians, as was revealed when a 1680 statute required county courts to record the ages of young slaves to determine whether their owners had to pay the tax on those over the age of twelve. In Henrico County, the center of the Indian slave trade, the court recorded thirty-three Indian children and no "Negros." In other counties, between one-half and one-third of those recorded were Indians.[41]

What about the neighbor Indians, whose status had been the key point of contention between Baconites and loyalists? Virginia's postrebellion governors resolved this tension through a tacit compromise. On the one hand, they allowed colonists to stir up as much trouble as they liked among distant southern nations and to profit from the increased flow of Indian slaves that ensued. On the other hand, they returned to the prerebellion status quo in which neighbor Indians were to be treated as allies, a less expensive way of proceeding that still permitted them to be slowly ground down and dispossessed of their lands and political power through the tried and true weapons of free-ranging colonial livestock, epidemic diseases, unpredictable bursts of personal violence against Indians, surveyors' instruments, and the court system.[42]

Baconites endured but did not fully accept this compromise. Rather than again directly confronting their provincial governments over the issue, however, Bacon's heirs bided their time and, critically, linked their campaign to annihilate the neighbor Indians to the great crisis in English religious and dynastic affairs that dominated the nation's political life during the 1670s and 1680s. Bacon's Rebellion coincided with a movement during the 1670s to prevent Charles II's openly Catholic brother James, Duke of York, from succeeding him as king. Widespread popular unrest in England took an increasingly rabid anti-Catholic tone, and many people looked to the most appealing of Charles II's illegitimate sons, the Duke of Monmouth, to claim the throne when Charles died. Thus as the Baconites battled against the royal governor Berkeley in 1676 they took comfort from rumors that they "need not fear the king, nor any force out of England . . . for the king was dead and the people together by the ears & the Duke of York and the Duke of Monmouth fighting."[43]

Late in 1676, while the royal commissioners were still under sail from England and loyalist forces were just beginning to score major victories over the rebels, an anonymous colonist penned a "Complaint from Heaven with a Huy and crye and a petition out of Virginia and Maryland." Addressing himself to the king, Parliament, and the lord mayor and alderman of London, the author wrote that Bacon's death marked only the end of the first act of "the late tragedy." The complaint expressed the sentiments of planters in northern Virginia and Maryland who believed that even Bacon's analysis of their troubles had

[41] Coombs, "Beyond the 'Origins Debate,'" 253; Morgan, *American Slavery, American Freedom,* 330.

[42] For detailed analyses of the use of these weapons to dispossess Indians, see Rountree, *Pocahontas's People,* 89–143; and Rice, *Nature and History in the Potomac Country,* 108–42.

[43] Herbert R. Paschal, ed., "George Bancroft's 'Lost Notes' on the General Court Records of Seventeenth-Century Virginia," *Virginia Magazine of History and Biography,* 91 (July 1983), 356. Carla Gardina Pestana, *Protestant Empire: Religion and the Making of the British Atlantic World* (Philadelphia, 2009), 128–58.

not gone far enough. Like Bacon, they rejected the distinction between Indian allies and Indian enemies, but they further argued that Berkeley had been the dupe of a far more sinister figure: Lord Baltimore, the proprietor of Maryland, a powerful Catholic with close ties to Charles II and his brother James. Lord Baltimore, it was said, had arranged a deadly alliance between Indians and "papists." He was secretly in league with the Iroquois, the neighbor Indians, powerful English Catholics, the French and their American colonists, the Jesuits, and the Pope, the writer charged. All were part of a great conspiracy to destroy English Protestantism.[44]

Rumors of this far-flung conspiracy gained traction throughout the late 1670s and the 1680s, fueled in part by the one remaining continuity in the Chesapeake diplomatic system that had otherwise been swept away by Bacon's Rebellion and the two treaties of 1677: the Susquehannock War, now well into its second century and still showing no signs of abating. Guided by the Susquehannocks who now lived among them, Five Nations war parties targeted the Susquehannocks' oldest southern enemies, the Piscataways and other "neighbor Indians" in Virginia and Maryland, and (more selectively) some colonists as well. In the late 1670s they attacked English households in Bacon's old neighborhood at the falls of the James River, and well into the 1680s they struck at both colonists and neighbor Indians. As late as 1697 a Susquehannock war leader named Monges, who "still had tears in his Eyes" when he thought of his people's betrayal by their allies back in the fall of 1675, conspired with a dissident Piscataway faction to foment a war between the Piscataways, Virginia, and Maryland, thus tricking the Susquehannocks' enemies into exacting revenge against themselves. Each Iroquois-Susquehannock raid, multiplied in effect through the power of rumor, seemed to confirm the existence of the grand Indian-Catholic conspiracy.[45]

Also fueling the panic was the rising power of Louis XIV within Europe, accompanied by French colonial expansion into the interior of North America during the 1670s and 1680s. Conspiracy-minded colonists had no difficulty connecting the dots between the growth of French power, the presence of French Jesuit missionaries among the Five Nations, and Susquehannock-Iroquois raids on the Chesapeake frontier. They also had no difficulty in believing that the neighbor Indians, including even the Piscataways, were secretly plotting with the Iroquois and the French.[46]

The final and most frightening links in the plot, however, were made between London and Versailles, between James II and Louis XIV. Many English Protestants, primed by the long-running political struggle to exclude the Catholic James from the throne during the 1670s and still thrilling to the Popish Plot of 1678–1681, expected a crisis when Charles II died and James became king. James did not disappoint. After assuming the throne in 1685 James took measures to lessen the persecution of Catholics in

[44] "Complaint from Heaven with a Huy and crye and a petition out of Virginia and Maryland," n.d., C.O. 1/36, pp. 213–18, reel 92, call no. 1607, Virginia Colonial Records Project (Virginia Historical Society, Richmond). An error-ridden transcription is printed in William Hand Browne, ed., *Archives of Maryland,* vol. V: *Proceedings of the Council of Maryland, 1636–1667* (Baltimore, 1887), 134–52. Jasper Danckaerts and Peter Sluyter, *Journal of a Voyage to New York, and a Tour of Several of the American Colonies in 1679–80,* trans. Henry Cruse Murphy (Brooklyn, 1867), 220–21.

[45] George Brent to Francis Nicholson, June 29, 1697, in *Archives of Maryland,* vol. XXIII: *Proceedings of the Council of Maryland, 1696–1698,* ed. William Hand Brown (Baltimore, 1903), 187–88; Rice, *Nature and History in the Potomac Country,* 143–73; Richter, *Ordeal of the Longhouse,* 145.

[46] Warren R. Hofstra, "'The Extention of His Majesties Dominions': The Virginia Backcountry and the Reconfiguration of Imperial Frontiers," *Journal of American History,* 84 (March 1998), 1281–1312; Owen Stanwood, *The Empire Reformed: English America in the Age of the Glorious Revolution* (Philadelphia, 2011), 54–112.

England and continued his predecessor's drift away from an alliance with the Protestant Dutch and toward Louis XIV and France. Conspiracy-minded English Protestants on either side of the Atlantic went on high alert for signs that the cosmic struggle was about to reach its climax. Wild rumors flourished especially in northern Virginia and Maryland during the 1680s. Many believed that neighbor Indians and Catholic colonists were merely biding their time before joining forces with the French, the Iroquois, and England's Catholic fifth column. Frequent panics and near-uprisings punctuated the decade.[47]

The breakthrough in resolving those tensions came in early 1689, when word arrived of William of Orange's successful invasion of England and James II's flight to France. It was a fraught moment throughout the colonies. How would the Glorious Revolution play out in the colonies, where the same sort of antipopery that drove the Glorious Revolution in England made large segments of the populace suspicious of their provincial governments? New York and the New England colonies, for example, had their own uprisings in the name of the new, reliably Protestant king and queen, William and Mary.[48]

The governments of Virginia and Maryland were both highly vulnerable to rebellion in 1689. Maryland, of course, was a proprietary colony ruled by Catholics, and the ruling Calvert family was strongly associated with James II. A long-established, heavily Protestant antiproprietary faction stood ready to take advantage of the overthrow of James II. Virginia's government was also suspect in the minds of many inhabitants. Having long maintained amicable relations with the Catholics who ruled Maryland, Virginia's rulers too were suspected of treason, especially by neo-Baconites. The periodic panics over a supposed Catholic-Indian conspiracy were nearly as disruptive in Virginia as they were in Maryland and, indeed, often originated there rather than in Maryland. Even along the James River, well to the south, it is evident from the phrasing of the scattered references to Catholic-Indian conspiracy theories that the writers were referring to a commonly understood set of ideas.[49]

Virginia only narrowly avoided an uprising. As Daniel Richter has argued, "Virginia seems to have refrained from the uprisings only because [Lord Howard of] Effingham [James II's appointed governor] happened to have sailed for England shortly before word of the revolution arrived." Thanks to Effingham's absence, the Virginia Council was free to act decisively to forestall a rebellion in the name of William, Mary, and Protestantism. Convinced that certain people were about to "Stirr up and Carry on a Rebellion," the council hastened to proclaim William and Mary as the new monarchs. It also suppressed dissent within Virginia by forcing seven "Notorious Actors in those Rebellious and Outragious Actings" to put up very large bonds for their good behavior.[50]

[47] Michael Graham, "Popish Plots: Protestant Fears in Early Colonial Maryland, 1676–1689," *Catholic Historical Review,* 79 (April 1993), 197–216; Stanwood, *Empire Reformed,* 25–112.

[48] David S. Lovejoy, *The Glorious Revolution in America* (New York, 1972). On the Glorious Revolution in England, see Steve Pincus, *1688: The First Modern Revolution* (New Haven, 2009); and Tim Harris, *Revolution: The Great Crisis of the British Monarchy, 1685–1720* (New York, 2006).

[49] Lois Green Carr and David William Jordan, *Maryland's Revolution of Government, 1689–1692* (Ithaca, 1974); Rice, *Tales from a Revolution,* 137–77. For examples of Virginians' fears of a Catholic-Indian conspiracy, see H. R. McIlwaine, ed., *Executive Journals of the Council of Colonial Virginia* (5 vols., Richmond, 1925–1966), I, 104–6, 111–12, 519; and William Hand Browne, ed., *Archives of Maryland,* vol. VIII: *Proceedings of the Council of Maryland, 1687–1693* (Baltimore, 1890), 79–80, 93–94.

[50] Richter, *Before the Revolution,* 300; McIlwaine, ed., *Executive Journals of the Council of Colonial Virginia,* I, 100–107, 519–20, 522, esp. 104, 105.

Although the council's quick response forestalled an uprising in Virginia, it did not prevent Virginians from promoting a neo-Baconite revolt in adjoining Maryland. Fueled by rumors coming out of Virginia of an imminent Catholic-Indian attack, tacitly encouraged by certain county elites in northern Virginia, and confident of support from "our neighbour Collony of Virginia" due to their "friendship, vicinity, great loyalty, and sameness of religion," Protestant Marylanders rose up in the name of William and Mary to eject the proprietary government of the Catholic Lord Baltimore. Maryland became a royal colony with reliably Protestant governors.[51]

The Glorious Revolution marked the triumph of Baconite Indian policies. The key figure in implementing those policies was Francis Nicholson, a former lieutenant governor of New York, whom William and Mary appointed as the long-term lieutenant governor of Virginia (1690–1692 and 1698–1704) and Maryland (1694–1698). Nicholson presided over the dispossession of one Indian nation after another. Almost every nation of neighbor Indians lost land through illegal sales and through white settlers squatting on their lands. The Pamunkeys, still in possession of a substantial reservation in the 1680s, lost so much territory in the 1690s that not enough remained to support the population. Some Piscataways gave up on Virginia and Maryland altogether, allying themselves with the Five Nations and William Penn. Although much of the nation remained along the Potomac, the Piscataways' hereditary chief and many others soon relocated to a new town on the Susquehanna River. Their eventual acceptance of Iroquois protection in the early eighteenth century marked the end, at last, of the Native American diplomatic system that had given birth to Bacon's Rebellion.[52]

By the first decade of the eighteenth century the major tensions underlying Bacon's Rebellion, both in Indian country and within colonial society, had subsided to the point that it is possible to discern a new order, a new settlement, falling into place. The neighbor Indians who remained were reduced to tiny reservations or completely dispossessed (though they persist to this day as communities). In the north two major treaties made in 1701, one at Albany and the other at Montreal, established a new, stable diplomatic system centered on the Five Nations and their closest allies (New France, New York, and the multiethnic Indian communities of the Susquehanna Valley); this Great Peace put an end to the Susquehannock War. The cycle of war, captivity, and migrations in the south continued to work in favor of Virginia's Indian traders, though increasingly their trade was in deerskins: Virginians had less use for Indian slaves in the eighteenth century as major changes in the Atlantic slave trade were for the first time making available large numbers of the enslaved Africans that Virginians had long preferred.[53]

[51] "Declaration Of the reason and motive for the present appearing in arms of His Majestys Protestant Subjects," July 25, 1689, *Archives of Maryland,* ed. Browne, VIII, 106; Carr and Jordan, *Maryland's Revolution of Government;* Lovejoy, *Glorious Revolution in America,* 251–93.

[52] Stephen Saunders Webb, "The Strange Career of Francis Nicholson," *William and Mary Quarterly,* 23 (Oct. 1966), 513–48; Rountree, *Pocahontas's People,* 105–27; Rice, *Nature and History in the Potomac Country,* 161–73.

[53] On the persistence of Indian communities within Virginia, see Rountree, *Pocahontas's People,* 100–277. On the northern diplomatic settlement, see James H. Merrell, *Into the American Woods: Negotiators on the First Pennsylvania Frontier* (New York, 1999); Jon Parmenter, *The Edge of the Woods: Iroquoia, 1534–1701* (East Lansing, 2010), 231–73; Richter, *Ordeal of the Longhouse,* 214–54; and Timothy J. Shannon, *Iroquois Diplomacy on the Early American Frontier* (New York, 2008), 38–77. Kelton, *Epidemics and Enslavement,* 160–220; Ethridge, *From Chicaza to Chickasaw,* 116–48; Coombs, "Beyond the 'Origins Debate'"; Walsh, *Motives of Honor, Pleasure, and Profit,* 131–44, 194–210; Allan Kulikoff, *Tobacco and Slaves: The Development of Southern Cultures in the Chesapeake, 1680–1800* (Chapel Hill, 1986), 205–60.

Historians seeking to understand Bacon's Rebellion by focusing on Virginia's planters, servants, and enslaved Africans have taught us much about the workings of colonial society and have confirmed the event's status as a landmark in American history. Yet inward-looking studies of Virginia society in the era of Bacon's Rebellion are inherently incomplete—not only in terms of who is included in the story but also in terms of their explanatory power. Even the label "Bacon's Rebellion" has inhibited understanding of the conflict by framing it too narrowly, much as the label "Mexican-American War" has obscured the centrality of Native Americans to that conflict. It is therefore time to fully integrate Indians into tellings of Bacon's Rebellion, and not merely as the people who sparked an internecine struggle among English colonists.[54]

Viewing Bacon's Rebellion from even a few strategically selected perspectives within Indian country forces a reconsideration of its causes, conduct, and ultimate significance. From the vantage point of the northern Chesapeake Bay, where this story began, it looks as if the causes of the rebellion had less to do with internal divisions among Virginians than with the Susquehannocks' long-term struggles against the Five Nations and the Piscataways. These conflicts stretched back deep into the sixteenth century and forward into the 1690s. As a result of this intra-Indian history the Susquehannocks were uniquely positioned to frighten Bacon's followers into a war against all Indians—and against all who, like Governor Berkeley, stood between the rebels and Virginia's Indian allies.

The Susquehannocks' relations with other Indian nations also shaped the conduct and the aftermath of Bacon's Rebellion, beginning with their defeat at the hands of the Occaneechees, continuing with their harassment by the Piscataways and other Indians, and culminating in their eventual absorption into the Five Nations. From the standpoint of the neighbor Indians who remained within the limits of the English settlements, Bacon's Rebellion marked a sharp downturn in their already shaky condition as independent nations, partly because Bacon viewed their extermination as his primary task and partly because Baconite Indian policies prevailed after the Glorious Revolution. Viewed from the southern Piedmont, the rebellion created a much-expanded market for the Indian slaves being generated by that region's spiraling cycle of warfare and captivity in the last quarter of the seventeenth century.[55]

Ironically, some Indian nations held their own or even gained strength as the issues at play during the rebellion were slowly worked out during the 1680s and 1690s. On the southern Piedmont the Catawbas, among others, held on by taking in people from newly dispersed nations. Certain Shawnee bands profitted, for the time being, from the maelstrom of wars and slave raids that characterized the era. (Among their victims were the Westos, who had been successful slavers during the 1660s and 1670s.) The Creek Confederacy grew significantly by adding entire towns of newcomers seeking safety in numbers. To the north, too, the aftermath of the rebellion had varied effects. The Susquehannocks, Piscataways, and other groups were subordinated to and in some respects absorbed into the Five Nations, but as a consequence of this (together with the treaties of 1677 and

[54] On the "Mexican-American War," see Brian DeLay, *War of a Thousand Deserts: Indian Raids and the U.S.-Mexican War* (New Haven, 2009).

[55] For an illustration of the destructive forces unleashed upon Virginia's immediate neighbors by Bacon's Rebellion, compare the maps in Rountree, *Pocahontas's People,* 106, 107.

1701) the Five Nations, faced with serious crises of their own during the late seventeenth century, gained a new lease on life.[56]

In the long run colonists in the Chesapeake Bay region benefitted either way, capitalizing on the successes of some Indian nations by buying Indian slaves from the victors in the intra-Indian wars that were expanding throughout the South. On their northern flank Virginians and Marylanders enjoyed a peace dividend thanks to their post-1677 alliance, however shaky, with the Five Nations. The ultimate result was less conflict with the Susquehannocks and Iroquois, especially after the 1690s. After the turn of the eighteenth century, the Five Nations' role in the final demise of the indigenous diplomatic system that had structured relationships in the northern Chesapeake since the sixteenth century, together with the rise of the Five Nations to diplomatic primacy in the northern Chesapeake, were of critical importance to Virginians and Marylanders: for the first time they could seriously contemplate the expansion of colonial settlements into the vast interior above the fall line.[57]

The story of Bacon's Rebellion, then, covers far more territory and a much longer time span than we have been led to believe. The origins of and the working solutions to the problems exposed by Bacon's Rebellion were forged as much in Indian country as they were within the heart of Virginia. Even then, of course, those solutions did not bring about stability or closure. Human affairs simply do not work that way. Instead, the resolution of the long-term conflicts that found expression during Bacon's Rebellion raised another set of issues: in the north, the role of Pennsylvania, the Five Nations, and their dependents along the Susquehanna River in the grand struggle that was emerging between the French and the English for control of eastern North America; and in the south, the constantly building pressure caused by what the anthropologist Robbie Ethridge has characterized as a vicious cycle "of debt, slaving, militarization, and warfare." These crises and their resolutions would mark other new departures, other critical turning points, in American history.[58]

[56] Steven C. Hahn, *The Invention of the Creek Nation, 1670–1763* (Lincoln, 2004); Jennings, *Ambiguous Iroquois Empire,* 223–375; Vernon Knight, "The Formation of the Creeks," in *Forgotten Centuries,* ed. Hudson and Tesser, 373–92; Meyers, "From Refugees to Slave Traders"; Mary Elizabeth Fitts and Charles L. Heath, "'Indians Refusing to Carry Burdens': Understanding the Success of Catawba Political, Military, and Settlement Strategies in Colonial Carolina," in *Mapping the Mississippian Shatter Zone,* ed. Ethridge and Shuck-Hall, 142–62; Stephen Warren and Randolph Noe, "'The Greatest Travelers in America': Shawnee Survival in the Shatter Zone," *ibid.*, 163–87; Kevin Kenny, *Peaceable Kingdom Lost: The Paxton Boys and the Destruction of William Penn's Holy Experiment* (New York, 2009), 11–62; Merrell, *Into the American Woods*. For a review of scholarship on the Iroquois in this period, see Edward Countryman, "Towards a Different Iroquois History," *William and Mary Quarterly,* 69 (April 2012), 347–60.

[57] Warren R. Hofstra, *The Planting of New Virginia: Settlement and Landscape in the Shenandoah Valley* (Baltimore, 2004), 50–93; Rice, *Nature and History in the Potomac Country,* 174–88.

[58] Ethridge, *From Chicaza to Chickasaw,* 132.

Copyright of Journal of American History is the property of Oxford University Press / USA and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.